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Price rigidity involves prices that do not change with the regularity predicted by standard economic theory, and is of 
long-standing interest to firms and industries, and our understanding of the economy as a whole. The previous IS 
literature has failed to identify the central role of IT and Internet retailing-related technologies to explain the rigidity 
of prices on the Internet. Instead, it has offered only limited explanations, such as menu costs and tacit collusion. 
These ideas, and quite a few other key theoretical perspectives were formulated in disciplines other than ours. 
Thus, the issue of price rigidity and price adjustment in Internet retailing should be given more scrutiny than the 
literature has provided to date. We review and synthesize what we know about price rigidity in non-electronic 
retailing contexts using a multi-level theory approach that identifies three unique levels of analysis: the firm-specific 
level, the firm-to-consumer level, and the firm-to-market level. We evaluate to what extent this knowledge is 
applicable to explain price-setting and price adjustment on the Internet. We conclude that there should not be less 
price rigidity in Internet retailing than in traditional retailing – even though the Internet is involved. To this end, we 
recommend a multi-level variance theory of Internet-based price rigidity. This study provides a foundation for the 
development of new theoretical perspectives at the crossroads of the academic disciplines of marketing, economics 
and IS. It encourages research that is able to probe for a deeper understanding of new economic phenomena 
associated with the digital economy’s growth.  
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1. Introduction 
Price rigidity, the inability of firms to adjust prices in the presence of forces that suggest they should 
change, occupies a central stage in the research agenda of new Keynesian macroeconomics (Ball 
and Mankiw, 1994; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1987) and industrial organization (Carlton, 1989; Stiglitz, 
1984). This is in contrast to the traditional assumption that firms flexibly adjust prices, which lies at the 
heart of classical economic models used in microeconomics, and in many areas of business such as 
finance, marketing, and strategy (Anderson, 1994; Blinder et al., 1998).   
 
Price rigidity is of particular interest in the context of Internet retailing, and the capabilities that firms 
now have to set and adjust prices flexibly (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Ghose and Gu, 2008; Oh 
and Lucas, 2006). For the purposes of this research on Internet retailing and price rigidity, it is 
important for us to establish the scope of our investigation. By the Internet and in the Internet retailing 
(or electronic retailing) context, we are referring to the set of technological, organizational and 
managerial capabilities that permit a firm’s prices to be made accessible to consumers and 
businesses via websites and other means to support the sales transactions for information, goods 
and services. Such activities are associated with electronic commerce. 1
 
 In contrast, traditional 
retailing does not involve the presentation of prices to consumers and businesses via the Internet. 
Instead, prices in traditional retailing are typically made available through in-store price tags, 
promotions, and advertisements in the print, television, and radio media, and by mail and phone, 
among other typically non-technological means.  
Today, the Internet offers opportunities to inform our understanding of price rigidity and the nature of 
price adjustment in two fundamental ways. First, the Internet provides a unique technological context 
for the micro-level study of price-setting behavior and strategies. In the late 1990s, when the hype 
around electronic commerce crested, it was commonplace in discussions among academic 
researchers to hear observations about how information technology (IT) was changing industry 
practices in strategic pricing. In fact, some of the most influential papers of that time, including Bakos 
(1997) and Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), adopted this general perspective that pricing is likely to be 
frictionless on the Internet. This suggested applying pricing models that were financial market-like – 
the strategic pricing equivalent of Clemons et al.’s (1999) market technostructure. The e-commerce 
marketplace now provides the functionality of the stock markets in terms of firms’ ability to adjust 
prices and consumers’ capacity to understand how they are changing. Sometime in 2001 and 2002 
though, the weight of the discussion and debate seemed to shift to pricing frictions in e-commerce, in 
spite of the revolutionary, powerful and new capabilities of technology to support the firm in adjusting 
prices (Baye and Morgan, 2004; Carlton and Chevalier, 2001).    
 
Second, the technologies that are associated with Internet retailing and price production operations 
have created forces to transform or reform
                                                     
1 It is important for us to help the reader to recognize the breadth of our application of these terms, since they will be 
easily misunderstood or misinterpreted by the reader. We will refrain from using the term “the Web” since the 
developments that we are considering are more specific to selling and pricing. We include the technologies that make 
it possible for consumers to identify the products they wish to buy, including search engines, shopbots, social 
networking systems (such as Twitter and Facebook), short message service (SMS) systems, recommender systems, 
and other emerging technologies that support consumer search for products and prices. Many of these have become 
available for mobile hand-held devices.  
 markets, so they operate differently from how they once 
did (Kim and Mauborgne 2005). Technological change has created an innovative new production 
process for prices, which, in turn, has transformed the landscape of business price-setting (Dutta et 
al., 2003). An alternative perspective is to view the strategic pricing process as reformed relative to 
the way things have worked in the past. From this viewpoint, we can think of strategic pricing as being 
brought to real-time delivery in electronic environments, without simultaneously suggesting that the 
business processes that exist around strategic processes are entirely different from before (Smith et 
al., 2001). Changes in price rigidity and flexibility levels at firms – if indeed there are any changes – 
should occur, in part, as a result of differences that relate to business processes for price production 
and price setting between the traditional and electronic environments. Therefore, firms may adjust 
prices on the Internet differently from the way they do than in traditional commercial settings, and 
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being able to detect this kind of behavior may change our conventional wisdom about price rigidity 
(Bailey 1998; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000).   
 
The issue of price rigidity in Internet retailing should be given more scrutiny than the literature has 
provided to date. The previous IS literature has failed to identify the central role of Internet 
technologies in the marketing function to explain the rigidity of prices on the Internet. Instead, it has 
offered only very limited explanations, such as the menu cost explanation (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 
2000; Bailey, 1998) and tacit collusion (Campbell et al., 2005; Kauffman and Wood, 2007). Although 
this work has been commendable and innovative in its efforts to open up a meaningful dialogue 
across economics, marketing, and IS, it has been limited in its scope from a theoretical perspective. 
There may be factors that can explain the price-changing behavior that Internet retailers demonstrate 
other than menu costs and collusive behavior. For example, there still seems to be a role for market 
forces to play in price adjustment, even for Internet retailers (Bergen et al., 2005; Oh and Lucas, 
2006). Firms may also make use of non-price elements, such as customer service, product 
information, reputation or fast delivery, instead of price adjustments (Clay et al., 2002a). In addition, 
certain price points maybe observed like 99¢ – even on the Internet – due to consumers’ rational 
inattention to the last digit of the price, and sellers’ interest in exploiting their decision-making 
behavior (Lee et al., 2009). Furthermore, there may be differences in price adjustment tactics that are 
observed for different firms relative to different products (Bergen et al., 2005; Ghose and Gu, 2008; 
Kauffman and Lee, 2004a). Similar explanations may also occur at the level of industries, as well as 
within or between sales channels.  
  
With this concern in mind about the pervasive expectation of declining price rigidity in Internet 
retailing, IS researchers have an important opportunity to address research questions from the unique 
perspective of our academic field: 
 
• Should we expect less price rigidity in Internet retailing, compared to traditional non-Internet 
channels? Are there any differences in price-changing behavior within and between firms, 
channels, and industries?  
• What theories or theoretical knowledge would provide a basis for understanding what we 
observe?   
 
To answer these questions, we will draw upon perspectives that are new to the IS field, but offer rich 
opportunities for theory-building and empirical research in settings that will be closely related to IS 
research. The objective of this research is to deliver a critical survey of the research in the area we 
have selected – price rigidity and price adjustments – and to support further exploration on the basis 
of a set of carefully distilled theoretical truths. To make the case in this article, we primarily develop 
our arguments from the perspective of IS and economics research. We will return to a number of 
specific ideas that have guided and helped us sort out the many conflicting (menu costs and 
managerial costs, inventory, and demand) and complementary (search costs and price points, implicit 
contracts and customer antagonization) ideas that are available. We will also discuss ideas that have 
aided our clarification of the different perspectives on the relevant research levels (micro-macro, 
consumer-firm-market) and the relationships among them. Further, we will consider the ideas that 
facilitated our determination of the paramount theoretical explanations, informed our assessment of 
new theoretical knowledge, and enabled us to present a more convincing synthesis of current thinking 
in this area.   
 
The aim of this article is to review and synthesize what we know about price rigidity in non-electronic 
contexts and to discover the extent to which this explains dynamism of price setting as observed in 
Internet retailing. We use this review to set up an agenda for future research that involves the 
presentation of a multi-level variance theory of price rigidity in Internet retailing. Section 2 presents 
our organizing framework for this research. Section 3 discusses the firm-specific level of analysis and 
what is known about price rigidity in traditional contexts and how the relevant knowledge is applicable 
to price setting on the Internet. Section 4 extends this view by assessing different theoretical 
perspectives that bring different issues into focus at the firm-to-consumer level of analysis. Section 5 
explores knowledge about price rigidity and price adjustment at the firm-to-market level of analysis, 
where we see different impacts associated with the use of various technologies that have made 
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Internet retailing possible. Section 6 discusses the empirical evidence of price rigidity in Internet 
retailing from the point of view of our multi-level theory analysis. It also presents an evaluation and 
synthesis of the value and the benefits of the theory work in this research. Section 7 concludes with a 
discussion of a number of managerial implications for pricing managers, as well as the work’s 
limitations and possible extensions for future research.  
2. Research Framework   
We next survey interdisciplinary perspectives that help to position this work with respect to strategic 
pricing, price rigidity, and price adjustment as an important new area for IS research. We will 
concentrate on theories from economics and marketing. Based on our examination of different 
theories on price rigidity and price adjustment, we propose a multi-level, multi-theoretical research 
framework that considers the impacts of Internet retailing-related technologies. The research 
framework provides a means to evaluate the observed empirical evidence for price-change behavior 
in Internet retailing in a manner that emphasizes theory. 
2.1. Price Rigidity Theories in Economics and Marketing 
For IS researchers to appreciate the new opportunities that we have with respect to the study of IT-
driven phenomena in strategic pricing in the marketing function, it is necessary for us to master the 
vast, theoretically complex, and methodologically mature literature on price rigidity and price 
adjustment in economics and marketing. Moreover, we need to come to grips with the complementary 
and contradictory aspects of the multi-theoretic predictions, and the range of ideas that are offered for 
when the different theories are likely to be most operative. We also need a means to locate the 
theoretical perspectives in the space of our analysis – in multi-level theory terms – as suggested by 
the organizational research work of Klein and Kozlowski (2000a, 2000b) and Kozlowski and Klein 
(2000). Though their work does not involve economic analysis, it nevertheless supports a key insight 
that proved to be very powerful to us in this research: that different theories most effectively treat 
unique levels of analysis of a business problem. As the reader will soon see, this enabled us to be 
more effective in our selection of price rigidity-related theories, since different theories offer useful 
managerial and economic knowledge at different levels of analysis. First though, we need to establish 
some basic definitions to ensure that the IS reader is familiar with the conceptual underpinnings of 
research in the price rigidity area. 
 
Price rigidity is an essential component of new-Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Economists refer 
to this as the economics of nominal rigidities (Blinder et al., 1998; Carlton, 1989).  Some other terms 
are also used, including price inertia, price stickiness, and price inflexibility.  Rigid prices occur when 
prices do not adequately change in response to underlying cost and demand shocks (Anderson, 
1994). Once set, prices often remain unchanged, in spite of changes in the underlying conditions of 
supply and demand. Price rigidity has the potential to prevent Walrasian market clearing that leads to 
equilibrium in supply and demand and market efficiency (Carlton and Perloff, 2000). 
 
An influential study of price rigidity was conducted by Means (1935), who found that some prices are 
administered, and consequently, are insensitive to fluctuations of supply and demand.  Later, a wide 
range of theories, based on price adjustment costs, market interactions, asymmetric information, and 
demand and contract-based explanations, were proposed to explain why price changes might be 
sluggish (Andersen, 1994; Blinder et al., 1998). Table 1 lays out and briefly explains the multi-
theoretical background of current knowledge on price rigidity. 
 
A number of settings have been of special interest to researchers, who have revealed rich multi-
theoretical knowledge about price adjustment. Some of the contexts that have been studied in terms 
of price rigidity include: product quality (Allen, 1988), inventory policies (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1983), crude oil price changes and gasoline prices at the service station pump (Borenstein et al., 
1997), wholesaler contracts (Carlton, 1979), banking and financial services (Hannan and Berger, 
1991), and grocery stores (Powers and Powers, 2001). However, the weight of these studies 
suggests that there has been no single reason
 
 for either price adjustment or price rigidity, but rather a 
variety of useful theories to explain what has been observed.  
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Table 1:  A Multi-Theoretical Overview of Price Rigidity 
Theories Explanations 
Cost of  
Price  
Adjustment 
Changing prices is costly, so prices go unchanged even with changes in supply 
and demand.   
• Menu Cost: Firms face a lump sum cost whenever they change their prices. 
• Managerial Cost: Time and attention required by managers for price 
decisions may slow down price changes. 
• Synchronization and Staggering: Stores change the prices of different 
products either together due to menu costs, or independently due to 
managerial costs. 
Market  
Structure 
Monopoly power and coordination failure in markets are the primary sources of 
price rigidity. 
• Industry Concentration: Sluggish price changes often indicate monopoly 
power in the mix.  
• Coordination Failure: Absence of an effective coordinating mechanism for 
market clearing leads to price rigidity. 
Asymmetric 
Information 
Price rigidity may arise when one party to a transaction has more information 
than another. 
• Price as Signal of Quality: Firms are reluctant to lower prices for fear that 
their customers may misinterpret price cuts as reductions in quality.   
• Search and Kinked Demand Curve: Customer search costs lead to firms 
facing a kinked demand curve. 
• Psychological Price Points: Prices tend to get stuck at certain ending 
prices, because firms know about the psychological responses to them on the 
part of the consumer. 
Demand-Based 
Firms react to other changes (inventories, non-price elements) than price 
changes. 
• Procyclical Elasticity of Demand: Demand curves become less elastic to 
price changes as they shift in. 
• Inventories: Inventories are used by firms to buffer demand shocks. 
• Non-Price Competition: Instead of making changes to their prices, firms use 
non-price elements such as delivery lags, service, reputation, or product 
quality to be competitive. 
Contract-Based 
Prices remain unchanged in the presence of explicit or implicit contracts. 
• Explicit Contracts: Prices become fixed for limited time periods under 
nominal contracts.  
• Implicit Contracts: Price changes may antagonize customers, so implicit 
agreements are established between firms and customers to stabilize prices 
and diminish friction.   
2.2. A Framework for Price Rigidity in Internet Retailing 
The unprecedented growth of Internet retailing-related technologies has resulted in enormous 
impacts and opportunities at the micro-level of consumers and firms, as well as at the macro-level of 
industries and markets. From the firm’s perspective, such technologies enable firms to adjust prices 
differently, which may change our conventional wisdom about price rigidity. Many observers have 
commented that physical price adjustment costs that are affected by menu costs are almost entirely 
absent in Internet retailing because they primarily consist of simple database updates, which may be 
easily programmed (Bailey, 1998; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000). This suggests that Internet retailers 
have the capability to adjust prices more flexibly than traditional retailers, like financial markets for 
foreign exchange and equity trading, where there are pure supply and demand plays (Clemons et al., 
1999). From the consumer’s perspective, Internet retailing-related technologies greatly reduce search 
costs and switching costs between competitive sellers, enabling buyers to easily compare products 
and their prices by using search engines or shopbots (Daripa and Kapur, 2001; Varian, 2000).  Not 
only do the new technologies far surpass the capabilities that have been available in traditional 
bricks-and-mortar stores to adjust prices and track competitors’ prices, they provide the basis for 
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consumers to make to-the-penny price comparisons (Bakos, 1997; Bergen et al., 2005).  Also from 
the market perspective, Internet technologies have profoundly impacted the scope and efficiency of 
markets. This has made prices and costs more transparent, lowering technological barriers to entry, 
and creating more competitive markets (Brynjolfsson and Kahin, 2000). 
   
With these observations about the new economy in mind, we now turn to the application of the new 
theoretical perspectives for price rigidity in the context of Internet retailing. The theories are all related 
to existing price rigidity theories that have been developed and applied to traditional retailing contexts. 
(See Table 1.) A key basis for price rigidity theories is that prices are under the control of and 
administered by firms, and not subject to the laws of supply and demand (Carlton and Perloff, 2000; 
Means, 1935). The firm sets or changes its prices based on its own pricing capabilities, in terms of 
menu costs and managerial costs, as well as in response to consumer actions and behavior. The 
changes occur in the presence of different market structures and degrees of industry concentration 
(Andersen, 1994; Blinder et al., 1998). Price rigidity theories explain the observed behavior of 
consumers, firms and their pricing strategies, and markets in Internet retailing environments. 
 
Based on interdisciplinary theories from marketing and economics, we propose a research framework 
to examine different theories on price rigidity that will be observed in Internet retailing environments at 
the different levels of analysis covering the firm, the consumer, and the market. More specifically, we 
examine possible causes of price rigidity in Internet retailing by considering that firms’ pricing 
capabilities are mediated by IT and Internet technologies, as well as their interactions with consumers 
and the market. (See Figure 1.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Multi-Level, Multi-Theory Framework for Price Rigidity in Internet Retailing 
Note: It is well recognized in the marketing and economics literature that different price rigidity theories treat 
different levels of analysis, and some may have overlaps. 
At the firm-specific level, we emphasize Internet retailers’ strategic pricing capabilities. This especially 
includes the firm’s production process for prices. This production process is driven by intensive use of 
Internet retailing-related technologies to evaluate the effectiveness of changing prices relative to other 
traditional competing retailers. In particular, we consider Internet retailers’ enhanced organizational 
capabilities (in terms of information available on demand, inventory, and non-price competition, as 
well as price adjustment costs) and their impacts on real price changes.  
 
At the firm-to-consumer level, we focus on Internet retailers’ price-changing behavior influenced by 
the psychology and behavior of consumers. New technological capabilities impact both the firm and 
the consumer, and help to explain why we observe price rigidities in Internet retailing. These include 
leveraging firm-level incentives to avoid customer anger incurred by violations of implicit contracts, 
Internet  
Retailer Consumer Market 
Firm-Specific Level 
• Price adjustment costs 
• Non-price competition 
• Demand and Inventory 
Firm-to-Market Level 
• Industry concentration 
• Coordination failure 
Firm-to-Consumer Level 
• Contracts 
• Information asymmetry 
• Psychological price points 
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taking advantage of customers’ psychological misinterpretation of price cuts as quality reduction, and 
responding to consumers’ rational inattention to certain price endings and psychological price points.   
 
Finally, we examine Internet retailers’ pricing behavior at the firm-to-market level. Market structure, 
the level of competition, and possible collusive actions, including tacit collusion, also influence them. 
IT and Internet technologies also affect pricing behavior differently compared to traditional 
environments.  
 
We will discuss these theories in the next several sections to evaluate price rigidity for the context of 
Internet retailing. We also develop our theoretical arguments in response to our research questions, 
specifically emphasizing the mediating role of the Internet to explain price rigidity. We have chosen 
different contexts that will help make this work more grounded and illustrative for the reader.2
3. The Firm-Specific Level of Analysis 
  First, 
we chose the context of cross-channel pricing – represented by bricks-and-clicks retailers that 
operate as traditional retailers and as Internet retailers via their associated .com entities. Second, we 
selected pure Internet-only retailers, and explore how the price rigidity and price flexibility issues 
contrast in that setting. Where it seems to be appropriate, we also offer additional examples that 
illustrate aspects of the price rigidity and price flexibility issues that we are examining, in situations 
where the bricks-and-clicks and Internet-only national retailers examples do not quite fit. 
In the 1990s and earlier, technology-driven pricing was largely in the domain of the airlines, as well as 
that of hotels and rental car companies that implemented revenue yield management practices. The 
technologies of that pre-Internet era combined powerful underlying data capture and online, real-time 
capabilities. They also took advantage of advanced knowledge in economic modeling and marginal 
value-based price discrimination approaches. This enabled companies like Marriott and American 
Airlines to effectively implement revenue yield pricing structures, as well as to make day-to-day 
adjustments in “demand bucket” prices in response to shifting demand patterns and shocks (Clemons 
et al., 2002; Hagel and Armstrong, 1997). Today, however, we have the same kinds of technologies 
available in many price-setting contexts that do not involve perishable products and services. As a 
result, now it is possible for bricks-and-clicks firms and traditional retailers to implement systems that 
permit significant adjustments to be made to prices in situations where menu costs previously made 
rapid price changes uneconomical (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Gulati and Garino, 2000). 
 
Intenet Retailer 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Price adjustment 
(or rigid prices) 
Figure 2. The Firm-Specific Level of Analysis for Price Rigidity in Internet Retailing 
                                                     
2 In a critical survey of the literature, it is important to explain to the reader what constitutes a valid illustration of the 
application of the theoretical ideas that we will evaluate, extend and discuss. In our view, a valid illustration needs to 
have several desirable properties – and preferably, all of them. First, a valid illustration should be based on actual 
observations of the real world, whether through empirical studies that work with large-scale data or through small-
scale data analysis or case study analysis. Second, a valid illustration should be drawn from a context that analysts 
would recognize as being representative of the setting in which the phenomenon under study arises. This suggests, 
for example, that pricing patterns in a time of economic shocks, such as sky-rocketing gasoline prices during a time of 
war, or used car prices after a large-scale recall occurs, should not be considered. Finally, a valid illustration should 
be one that is not subject to conflicting interpretations that diminish the force of the logic that it should support.  
Technological 
Capabilities  
(Internet  
Retailing-Related 
Technologies) 
Cost and demand 
shocks 
• Price adjustment costs  
• Inventory and demand 
• Non-price elements 
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With new retailing activities enabled by the Internet, we expect to see changes that reflect the 
different technological underpinnings of the firm’s production process for prices (Dutta et al., 2003). 
The reduction in search costs for attractive prices and bargains is accompanied by opportunities for 
firms to implement algorithmic price discrimination approaches that segment customers based on 
customer relationship management (CRM) systems information and new data mining techniques. It is 
natural, then, that Internet retailers will create new ways to set and adjust prices. We consider the 
mediating role of Internet retailing-related technologies in terms of the strategic pricing of Internet 
retailers. This permits us to think through the impacts of the new technology capabilities of firms to 
adjust prices in response to cost and demand shocks. (See Figure 2.) 
3.1. Price Adjustment Costs 
One explanation for price rigidity is based on theories of price adjustment costs: it is costly for firms to 
change prices (Barro, 1972; Mankiw, 1985). A profit-maximizing firm facing price adjustment costs will 
change its prices less often than an identical firm without such costs (Blinder et al., 1998). Price 
adjustment costs include the real costs associated with price changes: printing new catalogs, new 
price lists, new packaging, etc.; informing sales people and customers; obtaining sales force 
cooperation; and spending time to obtain managers’ commitment to gather and process relevant 
information, and to make and implement decisions (Levy et al., 1997). So these theories explain the 
rigidity of prices for two important costs generated by firms: menu costs and managerial costs 
(Blinder et al., 1998; Zbaracki et al., 2004). 
 
Menu Costs.  Menu cost theory assumes that the cost of price adjustment is a fixed cost that must 
be paid whenever a price is changed, and, thus, is independent of the magnitude of the price change 
(Barro, 1972). Some of the states in the U.S. require item pricing by law, which is known to add about 
20¢ to 25¢ per item, on average, and so changing item prices is not free for the seller (Bergen et al., 
2008). Menu costs drive firms to make relatively large and infrequent price changes, and, thus, make 
prices less flexible by deterring recurrent price changes (Ball and Romer, 1990). Mankiw (1985) 
states that in monopoly competition, a firm’s increased return from changing prices is smaller than the 
increased social welfare. So prices may not change, even with inefficient allocations. Interestingly, 
prior to the studies by Mankiw (1985) and Akerlof and Yellen (1985), menu costs were thought to be 
too small to result in any substantial effects related to price rigidity. Introducing real rigidities in the 
face of aggregate demand shocks, Ball and Romer (1990) argue that even with small costs of 
nominal price changes, firms do not change their prices, and real prices remain unaffected. Fluet and 
Phaneuf (1997), using a model where the production technology in the monopolistic firm is 
endogenous to the menu cost, claim that price adjustment costs have the same effect as an increase 
in the randomness of demand.   
 
Testing menu cost theory directly has been hard due to the lack of cost-related data (Carlton, 1986). 
In many settings, the costs of collecting such data are prohibitive. As a result, empirical studies have 
used indirect proxies (frequency of price changes and time between changes) to provide evidence 
supporting this theory (Cecchetti, 1986; Kashyap, 1995; Levy et al., 2002). Using data on actual trans
actions prices, Carlton (1986) finds that the fixed cost of price adjustment differs across buyers and  
sellers. Cecchetti (1986) analyzes the frequency and size of price changes in newsstand magazines 
and shows that higher inflation causes more frequent price changes, and price adjustment costs are  
not fixed; instead, they vary with the size of real price changes. Kashyap (1995) notes that, for 12  
selected retail items sold through catalogs over 35 years, heterogeneity existed in both the frequency 
and the amount of price changes. Based on survey data from New Zealand businesses, Buckle and 
Carlson (2000) assert that larger firms change prices more often than smaller firms due to menu  
costs, which fall systematically as firm size increases. On the other hand, Powers and Powers’ (2001) 
analysis of price data from grocery stores shows a symmetric pattern in the frequency and size of  
price changes for price rises and declines.   
 
Managerial Costs. Managerial costs, also called decision costs (Sheshinski and Weiss, 1992), are  
defined as the managerial time and effort dedicated for relevant information gathering and price  
decision-making (Ball and Mankiw, 1994; Levy et al., 1997). The theory of managerial costs assumes 
that firms cannot change their prices promptly in response to changes in their economic situations if 
many individuals’ decisions in a hierarchical organization are required to process a price change 
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(Bergen et al., 2003; Blinder et al., 1998; Hicks, 2007). Sheshinski and Weiss (1992) distinguish 
managerial costs from menu costs as the more critical component, arguing that these costs induce 
price staggering by firms. Mankiw and Reis (2002) incorporate managerial costs into a formal 
macroeconomic model, that they call a sticky information model. The model assumes that costs of 
information gathering and processing lead to slower information acquisition and price adjustment. 
Alvarez et al. (2010) make an even stronger argument: that firms optimize their price change 
decisions around menu costs and managerial costs of acquiring information.  
 
With direct measurement of the size of the managerial and customer costs in a single large 
manufacturing firm, Zbaracki et al. (2004) empirically analyze several types of managerial and 
customer costs, including costs of information gathering, decision-making, negotiation and 
communication.  They find that the managerial costs are more than six times greater than the menu 
costs associated with changing prices.  Thus, both physical menu costs and managerial costs give ris
e to price adjustment barriers within a firm (Bergen et al., 2003), although some consider managerial 
cost a special kind of menu cost (Blinder et al., 1998; Levy et al., 1997).   
 
Price Synchronization and Staggering. New-Keynesian macroeconomists assume that firms 
change prices step-by-step over time in a process that is called price staggering (Ball and Romer, 
1989; Blanchard, 1982). Not all firms change prices simultaneously. For example, some use price 
synchronization, the process of aligning strategic price changes in time, instead. Klenow and Malin 
(2010) argue that long-lasting price changes are surprisingly infrequent for many products, and may 
occur only once per year, once minor discounts and short-term inventory-based price adjustments are 
excluded. In oligopolistic markets, each firm takes into account the actions of its competitors, and 
thus, pricing policies will be interdependent, preventing the firm from changing its own products’ 
prices (Lach and Tsiddon, 1996; Sheshinski and Weiss, 1992).  Blanchard (1982) argues that 
staggered price-setting leads to inertia in the aggregate price level. Ball and Cecchetti (1988) propose 
price staggering and synchronization. They develop a model in which firms have imperfect 
information about the current state of the economy and obtain information by observing the prices set 
by others. This gives each firm an incentive to set its price shortly after other firms set theirs. Ball and 
Romer (1989) state that staggered price-setting is advantageous in that it permits rapid adjustment to 
firm-specific shocks, but the disadvantages include unwanted fluctuations in relative prices. 
Sheshinski and Weiss (1992) study optimal pricing strategy for a multiproduct monopolist when the 
timing of price adjustments is endogenous. They argue for a further source for interdependence, 
namely, increasing returns in the costs of price adjustment. They observe that pricing decisions are 
influenced by interactions in the profit function between the prices of the products and the nature of 
menu or decision costs. So, synchronization is induced when there are positive interactions between 
prices in the profit function and menu costs, where the cost of changing prices is independent of the 
number of products. Similarly, the price change process should be staggered over time under 
negative interactions in the profit function, and decision costs, where the cost of changing prices is pr
oportional to the number of products.  
 
There are relatively few empirical studies on price synchronization and staggering in traditional retail  
settings. The work on price rigidity has concentrated on single product firms for the most part. For  
example, Lach and Tsiddon (1996), using multiproduct pricing data from Israeli retail stores, find that  
price changes of the same product are staggered across firms (across-store staggering)  
while the price changes of different products are synchronized within the same firm  
(within-store synchronization). Also, Fisher and and Konieczny (2000), in their empirical work on 
Canadian newspapers, present evidence of synchronization within same firm, as well as staggering of 
newspaper prices. 
 
Price Adjustment Costs in Internet Retailing. Compared to traditional non-Internet markets, where 
significant costs associated with price adjustment are incurred, the Internet provides a new 
environment where physical price adjustment costs or menu costs are almost absent (Bailey, 1998; 
Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000). Changes in underlying technologies to support the production of price 
changes at the level of the firm lead to changes in costs of adjustment. This flexibility also suggests 
that Internet retailers like Amazon.com and Buy.com have the capacity to be more fluid, with price 
changes that are more spread out over time to match market demand. So, we also expect that new 
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technologies will offer firms the possibility to be more flexible and efficient in the application of pricing 
strategy. This logic may also be applied to physical stores with bar code scanner systems, since it is 
easy for the stores to change prices due to reduced menu costs. However, even for modern retailers 
like Target and Best Buy, there still are physical menu costs, including tagging and printing changed 
prices for individual items to provide new price information to offline consumers, among others.3
 
   
But what about the hybrid bricks-and-clicks firm? The Internet does not necessarily reduce the 
managerial costs for price changes because a firm’s Internet channel must be integrated with 
traditional channels to ensure, price and promotion consistency (Bergen et al., 2003; Gulati and 
Garino, 2000). 4
 
  So, bricks-and-clicks retailers like Best Buy and Target may not change prices 
frequently due to higher managerial costs stemming from their integration efforts, compared to 
Internet-only retailers like Amazon.com and Buy.com (Bergen et al., 2003). Table 2 compares price 
adjustment costs by channel.  
Table 2. A Comparison of the Price Adjustment Costs by Channel 
Cost Type Bricks-and-Mortar Bricks-and-Clicks Internet-Only 
Menu 
Costs 
High due to physical 
lump-sum costs 
High due to costs 
incurred by traditional 
channel 
Low, almost absent due to 
intensive use of IT 
Manageria
l Costs 
High due to 
hierarchies for 
decision-making 
High due to the 
integration efforts 
across channels 
Low due to less 
hierarchies for decision-
making 
 
There are several empirical studies that corroborate this argument in Internet retailing. Bailey (1998) 
finds that Internet retailers make significantly more frequent price changes than traditional retailers for 
homogeneous products, such as books and CDs. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) also observe that, 
due to low menu costs, online retailers make price changes that are up to 100 times smaller than 
those made by bricks-and-mortar sellers. In a recent study, Oh and Lucas (2006) find that online 
vendors in the computer commodity market synchronize the timing of price changes across stores 
due to low menu costs and increased supplier coordination. So, it appears that Internet retailers can 
adjust prices any day of the week throughout the year (Bergen et al., 2005). This is in contrast to 
grocery stores or traditional retailers, who adjust prices with sales fliers and print and radio advertise
ments to take advantage of greater demand that occurs around the weekend (Dutta et al., 1999). Inte
rnet retailers are capable of being more flexible than traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers due to their  
technology prowess. 
 
On the other hand, there are several empirical studies that provide evidence for price inflexibility in 
Internet retailing.  Analyzing the pricing behavior of two leading online bookstores, Amazon.com and 
BN.com, Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2005) find that online retailers exhibit within-store  
synchronization in price changes, and argue that price rigidities also exist in online environments. 
Tang and Xing (2001), comparing Internet retailers’ price changes for DVDs, find that Internet retailers 
do not change prices frequently, in spite of the small menu costs in the online environment. Tang and 
Xing (2001), comparing Internet retailers’ price changes for DVDs, find that Internet retailers do not 
change prices frequently, in spite of the small menu costs in the online environment. They argue that 
online prices may be prone to error, even though they may be easier to change.   
 
 
                                                     
3 Today, there still are a few bricks-and-mortar retailers that do not tag individual items for reading by barcode 
scanners. Most bricks-and-mortar retailers experience considerable menu costs for tagging and printing prices as 
well as printing new catalogs. So, our argument is valid in terms of the role of Internet retailing-related technologies 
for strategic pricing.   
4 For example, Best Buy advertises a store price guarantee on its website: “If you find a lower price on BestBuy. 
com or in a Best Buy Retail Store for the same brand and model during the exchange and return period, we will 
match that price. For purchases made on BestBuy.com, we will not match our competitors' store or website  
prices.” See http://www.bestbuy.com/site/Help-Topics/Bestbuy.com-Price-Match-Guarantee/pcmcat2044000500 
 11.c?id=pcmcat204400050011,  last accessed on June 21, 2010. 
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Although there may be contradictory evidence on price adjustment costs, price rigidity exists in 
Internet retailing due to managerial costs for channel integration. Further research will uncover the 
true relationship between price adjustment costs and price rigidity in Internet retailing. 
3.2. Non-Price Competition 
Prices are considered the primary means for market clearing and resource allocation in economics 
(Carlton and Perloff, 2000). Price competition occurs when a seller emphasizes the lower price of a 
product and sets it to match or beat its competitors. But Carlton (1989) points out that markets often 
clear through means other than price. He views price as only one of many dimensions of the terms on 
which products are exchanged. Non-price competition, thus, can be used most effectively when a 
seller can make its product stand out from the competition by enhancing product quality, setting 
delivery lags, stressing customer service, conducting promotional efforts, expanding advertising 
expenditures, etc. (Carlton, 1983; Maccini, 1973). Non-price competition seems to be especially 
prevalent where firms perceive that there are implicit long-term contracts with their customers that 
help to stabilize prices and where firms believe that their customers judge quality by price (Blinder et 
al., 1998; Okun, 1981). Thus, prices may appear rigid if other elements work to clear markets (Blinder 
et al., 1998; Carlton, 1989). Because the theory involves unobserved elements, such as service 
quality and promotional efforts, there are few empirical studies that explain the causes of price rigidity 
in traditional settings. 
 
Non-Price Competition in Internet Retailing. Online consumers also care about other non-price 
aspects, such as seller reputation, delivery locations and times, contract lengths, and so on.  So, the 
Internet has impacted both
 
 price competition and non-price competition between firms (Clay et al., 
2002a). For example, Internet retailers, as a result, may also offer high-quality services like customer 
support instead of lowering product prices, even if the underlying market conditions have changed. 
Such adjustments to non-price elements are likely to offer new ways to compete and will require firms 
to formulate new business rules, too (Kauffman and Wood, 2007). We also observe that the 
competition that motivates the use of non-price elements may not focus on obtaining specific 
transactions or purchases. Instead, the more important emphasis may be the competition to obtain 
new customers and to maintain high customer loyalty.   
The use of non-price elements does not necessarily indicate that online retailers adjust prices less 
frequently. Instead, we expect that retailers use non-price competition in Internet retailing just as in 
traditional retail environments, though it causes price rigidity.  
3.3. Inventories and Demand 
Inventories. Firms operating with little inventory are not able to avoid the impacts of unexpected 
demand shocks (Blinder et al., 1998; Okun, 1981). Achieving the right level of inventory becomes a 
key success factor for businesses and their supply chain management activities.  The level of 
inventory must be sufficient to meet consumer demand but also be low enough to minimize storage 
costs. Economists have considered inventories as buffers or inter-temporal substitutes which firms 
use to smooth fluctuations in demand and production (Blinder et al., 1982). The theory of inventories 
asserts that firms use inventories rather than price changes to cushion demand shocks. When 
demand falls (or rises), firms increase (or draw down) their inventories rather than decrease (or raise) 
prices (Blinder et al., 1998; Reagan, 1982). The price smoothing caused by inventories depends upon 
whether the demand shocks are perceived as short-run or long-run shocks (Irvine, 1980). Firms are 
likely to use inventory adjustments for temporary changes of demand. Amihud and Mendelson (1983) 
find that the degree of price flexibility and asymmetric price responses by firms to economic shocks is 
explained by the relationship between the cost of holding positive inventory and negative inventory. 
 
With permanent changes in demand, real price changes are inevitable. We have recently seen this 
with the downturn in demand and real prices for real estate (Christie 2009) and other services in the 
economy (Blackstone 2009), while the demand and real prices for used cars (Woodyard 2009) and 
gold (Scott 2010) have climbed dramatically. Since recent developments with respect to real prices 
are a result of economic failure in the U.S., and other foreign forces, and these are rather unusual 
developments, we hesitate to draw additional conclusions about the Internet economy and pricing 
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dynamics in Internet retailing. Most of the examples and illustrations that we might draw upon would 
not offer valid contexts because of the unexpected market changes that occurred from mid-2008 to 
early 2010. 
 
Several empirical studies corroborate the relationship between inventory management practices and 
price rigidities in traditional environments. Irvine (1980) shows that a short-run inventory-based 
pricing policy is observed in retail department stores: The price is above (below) its equilibrium level 
when the inventory is below (above) its optimal level. Borenstein et al. (1997) find that there may be 
temporary asymmetries in the adjustment of spot gasoline prices to spot crude oil prices due to 
production and inventory adjustment lags.   
 
Demand. Firm-level price-changing behavior over the business cycle necessitates that consideration 
be given to the roles of demand and supply shocks that relate to business cycles (Stiglitz, 1984). 
When economic fortunes wane, some companies may go out of business. Others may lose their least 
loyal customers, but retain their most loyal ones. If the number of companies falls significantly, this 
may increase the remaining firms’ ability to coordinate their prices, reducing price competition. In 
addition, firms will not reduce prices because the remaining customers may be insensitive to price 
changes (Bils, 1987; Toolsema and Jacobs, 2007). This trend is known as procyclical elasticity of 
demand (Warner and Barsky, 1995). It explains why the responsiveness or elasticity of prices to 
changes in demand may be dampened in a cyclical downturn. Stiglitz (1984) argues that prices 
become invariant across the business cycle even in the presence of a decline in the marginal costs of 
production. This is because anti-cyclical price markups may increase even if the elasticity of demand 
decreases (Blinder et al., 1998).   
 
There are some studies providing empirical evidence on procyclical elasticity of demand.  Warner and 
Barsky (1995) find such empirical evidence just prior to the Christmas holidays and also on three-day 
weekend holidays. These are times when consumers are engaged in more intense shopping or 
search activities. This phenomenon is also called the thick market effect. The idea is that firms have a 
somewhat counterintuitive tendency to charge lower prices during periods of peak demand (which 
contradicts the high demand leads to high price rule). This illustrates the will of firms to compete more 
aggressively on the basis of prices in markets with high demand, when there are also significant 
opportunities to generate revenues and earn a profit based on a high volume of sales (Axarloglou, 
2007).5
 
 In contrast to this perspective, though, Levy et al. (2010b) suggest that the opportunity cost of 
price adjustment increases dramatically for traditional retailers like grocery stores during high demand 
periods like Thanksgiving to Christmas. Since they do not experience the bulk of their annual demand 
then, they are more likely to exhibit a greater reluctance to change prices.  
Inventories and Demand in Internet Retailing. What has been changed in today’s environment, 
where new technologies impact the process of inventory logistics? There is no doubt that a 
foundational inventory level is necessary to serve and retain customers in Internet retailing. To 
increase sales, firms must be responsive to customers’ special needs and requests for supply chain 
and logistics support. From an economic perspective, firms want to be able to adjust prices to react to 
changes in demand. Yet this is often difficult to do in a traditional bricks-and-mortar retail setting. The 
flow of data and the processes and costs associated with changing prices can limit a traditional 
bricks-and-mortar store’s ability to react to these changes. Compared to traditional retailers like Best 
Buy and Target that require the highest inventories, Internet retailers are now able to more accurately 
control inventory and costs, and sample demand any time they need to. For example, Amazon.com 
has had much better inventory turnover than bricks-and-mortar bookstores. Amazon.com achieved 
10.42 times turnover in 2009, compared to 2.75 times for Barnes and Noble and 2.34 times for 
Borders (DailyFinance.com, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). Morgan Stanley also reported something similar 
to this in 1997 (Meeker and Pearson, 1997). Internet retailers also possess significant price-changing 
capabilities. The new technologies associated with the Internet provide traditional bricks-and-mortar 
                                                     
5 Chevalier et al. (2003) provide contradicting evidence that prices do not fall during the Thanksgiving and Christmas 
holidays, however. Instead, they find significant procyclical pricing patterns and seasonal cycles due to retail margin 
changes. This is consistent with the loss-leader competitive strategies of retailers. Loss-leader advertising is a 
strategy in which retailers offer a big discount in order to attract customers for future profits. 
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retailers with opportunities to adopt bricks-and-clicks retail capabilities, such as leveraging logistical 
and operational expertise with traditional distribution channels, as well as connecting their technology 
infrastructures with the Internet. And, with digital goods such as e-books or MP3 music, retail 
businesses can be designed with virtually no physical inventory. 
 
Rapid growth of online sales during the holiday period also provides Internet retailers with  
opportunities and incentives to attract potential consumers to their stores by applying the appropriate 
strategic pricing models.6
 
 New technologies offer the possibility to be more flexible and efficient in the 
application of pricing strategy, letting Internet retailers make immediate and frequent adjustments (Ba
ker et al., 2001). Price changes are more likely to be driven by demand considerations than by 
inventory levels in Internet retailing. As the demand for the product increases, firms have an incentive 
to more frequently lower prices to maximize their profits by attracting customers.   
Other observations lend support to this argument. For example, in the online bookselling industry, 
Kauffman and Wood (2007) find that the price of bestselling books is dependent on booksellers’ 
business rules for selling books. Books that are selling very well may be discounted more frequently 
compared to other book categories. This is because bestsellers face markets with less stable demand 
due to the effects of announcements and media buzz. These include the New York Times bestsellers 
list, leading book critics’ columns and so forth. Analyzing more than over three million daily 
observations of prices for books, CDs, and DVDs, Kauffman and Lee (2007) find that product 
demand, in terms of sales ranks from Amazon.com and BN.com, positively affects the frequency of 
observed price changes. In addition, they find that the bestseller category shows the highest 
percentage of price changes compared to other categories. These include computer books, new 
books, and steady sellers. We conclude that price changes in Internet retailing are more likely to be 
driven by demand than inventories. 
3.4. Discussion of the Firm-Specific Level of Analysis 
Our multi-level theory evaluation perspective was helpful in our review of prior literature and theories 
on price rigidity at the firm-specific level. At this level of analysis, we considered the role of the firm’s 
new technological capabilities and its impact on price changes in Internet retailing. Table 3 suggests 
theories for traditional retailing also relevant for Internet retailing.  
 
The theories are all unique at the firm-specific level, where managers experience menu and 
managerial costs for price changes, and have the opportunity to make studied business policy 
choices about how they use inventories in reaction to changing demand. In addition, managers have 
some choices about how they synchronize or stagger a firm’s price changes, even if they do not have 
total control as they might wish due to cost factors. Their choices also affect whether they use non-
price elements. After considering the empirical evidence, at this level of analysis, the most relevant 
theories include the theory of managerial costs, price synchronization theory, non-price competition 
theory, and demand theory. These appear to explain the possible causes of price rigidity in Internet 
retailing based on the current empirical evidence. Other explanations that pertain to menu costs and 
inventories that a firm holds may not be as applicable to Internet retailing contexts as the others, 
again, based on the empirical evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 During the 2009 winter holiday season, November 1 to December 31, online shoppers in the U.S. spent $29.1 
billion excluding travel, a gain of 4% over the prior year’s sales of $28.0 billion (comScore, 2010). Previously during 
the 2008 Christmas season, a number of leading retailers, including Amazon.com, Wal-Mart and Target, offered big 
discounts. Amazon.com had the best ever holiday, as a result, selling 73 items per second on the peak day (Helft, 
2008; Product Review News, 2008).   
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Table 3. Summary of the Firm-Specific Level of Analysis 
Theory 
Traditional Setting Internet Retailing Match 
with 
Theory Prediction 
Empirical 
Evidence Prediction 
Empirical 
Evidence 
Menu Costs Menu costs deter price changes. 
Carlton 
(1986), Levy 
et al. (1997) 
Due to low menu costs, 
prices can be changed by 
any amount at any time. 
Bailey (1998), 
Brynjolfsson and 
Smith (2000) 
No 
Managerial 
Costs 
Managerial costs deter 
price changes. 
Zbaracki et al. 
(2004) 
Managerial costs still exist 
due to integration efforts. 
Bergen et al. 
(2005), Tang and 
Xing (2001) 
Yes 
Price 
Synchroniza
tion and 
Staggering 
Firms change prices 
together due to menu 
costs, or 
independently due to 
managerial costs.  
Lach and  
Tsiddon 
(1996), Fisher 
and Konieczny 
(2000) 
Due to low menu costs, 
across-store 
synchronization will exist. 
Oh and Lucas 
(2006) Yes 
Non-Price  
Competition 
Firms will use non-
price elements instead 
of price changes. 
N/A 
Non-price elements can 
be used instead of price 
changes. 
Clay et al. 
(2002a), 
Kauffman and 
Wood (2007) 
Yes 
Inventory 
Firms use inventories 
to buffer demand 
shocks. 
Borenstein et 
al. (1997),  
Irvine (1980) 
With low inventory 
turnover, price changes 
will be more flexible. 
N/A No 
Demand 
In high demand 
periods, firms will 
change their prices 
frequently. 
Axarloglou 
(2007),  
Warner and 
Barsky (1995) 
Due to less dependency 
on inventory, prices will be 
changed frequently in high 
demand periods. 
Kauffman and 
Wood (2007), 
Kauffman and Lee 
(2007) 
Yes 
4. The Firm-to-Consumer Level of Analysis 
Internet retailing represents a transformed environment of mercantile exchange. More than other 
conclusions that observers have drawn about Internet retailing, the common wisdom is that Internet 
technologies have led to greater transparency, more widespread dissemination of information, and 
increasingly similar information about many elements of product, price, and market competition that 
are readily available to archrivals. This has been to the great benefit of consumers, who are now 
better informed about the opportunities they have to make value-maximizing purchases in the 
marketplace than ever before. In this context, it makes sense to undertake a careful assessment of 
the extent to which consumer-related forces are operative in determining the observed price rigidity 
and adjustment outcomes. Thus, our multi-level theory analysis now turns to firm-to-consumer level 
perspectives. 
 
 
 
Psychological behavior 
based on contracts, information asymmetries 
and psychological price points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Firm-to-Consumer Level Analysis for Price Rigidity in Internet Retailing   
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We next look at Internet retailers’ responses to consumer behavior and consumer psychology in 
determining price adjustments. We also consider how technology impacts firms and consumers to 
explain why price changes may be sluggish in Internet retailing. Due to our focus on the firm’s 
response to consumer behavior at this level, it is appropriate for us to cover a broad range of theories 
from economics, marketing, and psychology to identify the necessary issues and derive the related 
basis for understanding. We will focus on contracts, information asymmetries, and psychological price 
points at this level of analysis. (See Figure 3.) 
4.1. Contracts 
Contract-based theories provide an explanation of rigid prices in the context of transactions between  
firms and customers who enter into either explicit or implicit contracts that fix prices over a given  
period. Such contracts may provide insurance against uncertainty or risk in market conditions by  
delivering stable prices (Blinder et al., 1998). So, the theories have been used as important tools to  
understand price-setting and adjustment strategies.  
 
Explicit Contracts. Most firms that trade goods and services have nominal contracts that fix prices  
for finite periods of time to avoid uncertainties or transaction costs (Carlton, 1979). The theory of  
explicit contracts assumes that prices are not free to adjust to either demand or cost shocks  
underwritten contracts. Thus, from the perspective of this theory, firms may not be able to raise prices 
for existing customers without contract renegotiations, even with cost shocks or demand shocks (Hub
bard and Weiner, 1992). Blinder et al. (1998, p. 302) report that “about 85% of all goods and services 
in the U.S. non-farm business sector are sold to ‘regular customers’ with whom sellers have an  
ongoing relationship. And about 70% of sales are business to business rather than business to  
consumers.” The reader should think of the move-to-the-middle theory (Clemons et al., 1993) in 
procurement and the balance between achieving access to low cost inputs versus the risks of failed 
fulfillment that it implies. Explicit contracts explain rigid prices in the B2B context, such as supply  
chain-based procurement, where IT plays an important role as well. However, explicit contracts 
are not
 
 often made between firms and consumers in the Internet retailing context, so we exclude this 
theory in our discussion.  
Implicit Contracts. If customers and sellers trade with one another for long periods of time, they 
develop some attachment to making transactions involving the product (Carlton, 1986; Okun, 1981). 
This is referred to as the theory of implicit contracts. Any price changes for the product, as a result,  
can irritate customers when they think the changes are unreasonable (Bergen et al., 2003; Zbaracki  
et al., 2004). This theory can also be combined with customer antagonism theory, which suggests  
that customers may be antagonized, and react negatively whenever a price change exceeds the 
expected range or violates established pricing patterns from past periods (Blinder et al., 1998; Stiglitz, 
1999). Okun (1981) proposes the concept of the “invisible handshake” as a possible source of price 
rigidity in the product market. He argues that both firms and customers in long-term relationships are 
stimulated to become involved in implicit agreements that make prices rigid. However, Carlton (1986) 
posits that prices tend to be more flexible the longer the buyer-seller association. Customers involved 
in shorter relationships with suppliers are more likely to use fixed-price contracts because of the fear 
that they may be exploited by competitors’ price changes. Kahneman et al. (1986) also find that 
consumers feel cheated when firms exploit shifts in demand by raising prices.   
 
There is empirical evidence that lends support to this argument. Blinder et al. (1998) shows that 
implicit contracts exist within two-thirds of the purchasing economy. Powers and Powers (2001), in 
their study of grocery stores, find that large firms lose more customers to their rivals when they 
change prices. Zbaracki et al. (2004) provide qualitative evidence of managers’ fear of antagonizing  
customers. They argue that price changes call attention to prices and may damage the firm’s 
reputation, integrity and reliability. Rotemberg (2009) further notes that the size of price changes that 
are made by a firm will lead to different levels of customer regret. And finally, Mitev (2004) reports 
empirical evidence that French Railways’ move from fixed and predictable pricing to dynamic pricing 
by implementing revenue yield management caused a huge backlash from French public 
transportation users. Nevertheless, such system-based pricing practices later became widely 
accepted throughout Europe, the U.S., and Asia.   
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Customers may be less antagonized if price increases can be justified by increases in sellers’ costs 
(Kahneman et al., 1986; Okun, 1981). Thus, the customer and seller rely not only on established 
prices, but also on mutual trust, reciprocal fairness, and fair play for efficient allocation of products, all 
of which are elements of implicit contracts.  
 
Contracts in Internet Retailing.  But what about Internet retailing?  Are the same forces at work?  
Unexpected price changes in terms of implicit contracts may antagonize customers and diminish the 
firm’s reputation, even in Internet retailing. A classic example occurred in 2000 when Amazon.com 
experimented with a price discrimination policy to sell the exact same DVD titles at different prices to 
different customers. The outraged responses were swift and clear in their message to Amazon: don’t 
do this to your best customers! As a result, Amazon put its price experimentation policy on hold, 
apparently permanently, and also refunded money to consumers who paid the higher prices (Bergen 
et al., 2003; Rosencrance, 2000). With reduced consumer search and switching costs in Internet 
retailing, firms may lose more of their customers when they violate consumer expectations about 
pricing patterns. So, explanations of price rigidity in Internet retailing based on the theory of implicit 
contracts may apply to the Internet marketplace as well as traditional retail contexts. Still, there may 
be circumstances under which some contingencies come into play to override this conclusion.   
4.2. Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric information theory assumes that one party to a transaction, a firm, is better informed than 
the other, a consumer. It gives new insights about why market failures occur (Blinder et al., 1998). 
Stiglitz (1979) argues that under asymmetric information, customers tend to transact with firms with 
relatively stable prices and avoid firms that make frequent or large price adjustments. Since the 
theory always involves unobserved information, such as product quality and search costs, there are 
few empirical studies to explain the causes of price rigidity in these theoretical terms (Blinder et al., 
1998). 
 
In the context of Internet retailing, shopbots and search engines have diminished information 
asymmetries around product prices, descriptions, and quality. A countervailing force is also present, 
however, and this may give rise to a paradox with respect to the observed outcomes. Market 
transparency, the selling mechanism design capability of firms to make various dimensions of their 
products (especially product prices, descriptional completeness, quality level, and information 
accuracy) more visible or more opaque to consumers, will play a role here. Just as firms can 
strategically use new technologies to reveal information in Internet retailing, so can they also be used 
to strategically mask information and create induced informational asymmetries. Here again, 
empirical research will be necessary to sort out the conditions under which each explanation will be 
paramount in interpreting the outcomes. 
 
Search Costs and Kinked Demand Curves. Since Stigler’s (1961) inventive work on search theory, 
which is now critical to our understanding of the Internet retailing context, a number of studies have 
analyzed the impact of search costs and asymmetric information on price rigidity. The general 
argument is that search is costly to customers (Stiglitz, 1999), and a firm’s price changes will be 
observed by the firm’s current customers, but not by other customers due to the search costs (Ball 
and Romer, 1990; Stiglitz, 1979). If the firm raises its price by more than its customers expect, it may 
lose customers. Why? Because its regular customers instantaneously recognize the price change 
and search for other sellers with more attractive prices. If the firm lowers its price, it will sell more to 
current customers but will be unable to attract new customers due to the search costs involved: 
potential new customers will not be able to observe the lower price without a search (Stiglitz, 1987, 
1999). Thus, this theory suggests that search costs will make the demand curve more inelastic for 
price decreases than for price increases: kinked demand curves will occur. 
 
Search Costs in Internet Retailing. On the Internet, buyer search costs are almost negligible. 
Buyers can locate lower prices for products or services easily with the use of search engines or 
shopbots (Bakos, 1997; Varian, 2000). The reduced information asymmetry may increase the firm’s 
incentive to cut prices (Daripa and Kapur, 2001). Compared to retailing via traditional channels, the 
Internet enables firms to reach any individuals that have access to the Internet and to expand their 
customer base across regions and national borders. Lower search costs can make the demand curve 
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more elastic and lead to firms gaining more returns from price cuts than might otherwise be predicted. 
Therefore, the existing theory of search and kinked demand curves may not be able to explain price 
rigidities in Internet retailing. 
 
As we discussed earlier, there are few empirical studies to corroborate this theory due to the 
unobservable characteristics of search costs. Ghose and Gu (2008), using data collected from 
Amazon.com and BN.com, find that search costs vary even across Internet retailers: consumers face 
lower search costs for price information from Amazon than from BN. This leads to a higher incentive 
for Amazon to engage in price competition with more price adjustments but less incentive for BN to 
engage in price competition. 
 
Quality Signaling.  With so many products available, it is also difficult for customers to observe 
quality in traditional retailing even at the time of purchase because they are imperfectly informed 
about the product characteristics (Stiglitz, 1987). Most people typically believe that higher-priced 
products are of higher quality. Thus, firms may have an incentive to sell low quality items at high-
quality prices. Inevitably, products will be traded at a price that reflects their customers’ beliefs about 
the average quality of the products (Riley, 1989). The theory of quality signaling assumes adverse 
selection (Akerlof, 1970), where firms are reluctant to decrease prices in economic recessions for fear 
that customers may incorrectly interpret the lowering of prices as a signal that the product quality has 
been reduced (Blinder et al., 1998).7 But if cutting prices is interpreted as a quality reduction, then 
demand may actually decrease
 
 rather than increase (Stiglitz, 1984). Allen (1988) proposes a formal 
model of price rigidities based on the idea that the variations of unobservable quality make prices 
inflexible as long as demand shocks are sufficiently serially correlated. He shows that prices are 
inflexible for products whose quality cannot be easily observed, while prices are flexible in industries 
where quality is easier to gauge.     
Quality Signaling in Internet Retailing. Just as in the traditional market, online consumers can have 
difficulties with examining the quality of products or the product and service delivery capabilities of 
firms. At the time of purchase from an Internet retailer, the consumer is unable to see or feel the 
actual product. As a result, the consumer’s assessment of the actual features or true quality of a 
product online may be inaccurate. Also, it is doubtful that Internet retailers with low online prices will 
be the most reliable. So digital intermediaries, such as a trusted third party or an online reputation 
mechanism, will play a significant role in building trust between buyers and sellers to further refine 
and perfect business processes associated with Internet-based transaction-making. The Internet also 
gives consumers access to different information about products and firms than has ever been 
available before. Moreover, it has changed the composition of firms in the marketplace, and the ways 
that customers can interact with Internet retailers. Higher quality firms tend to have higher product 
quality, service levels, product assortments and support. They may face higher costs or charge higher 
margins for their products. This leads to higher prices for higher-quality firms. Varian (2000) predicted 
two types of Internet sellers: those with low service levels and low prices, and those with high service 
levels and high prices. In addition, higher quality firms that signal the market with their higher prices 
are more sensitive to consumers’ responses to unexpected price changes.   
 
Some empirical research has been done to support this theoretical argument. Baylis and Perloff 
(2002) find evidence that the price ranking of Internet retailers selling consumer electronics products 
does not change frequently: high-price firms usually keep their prices high over long periods. 
Kauffman and Lee (2004b) also report, in their analysis of homogenous products such as books, 
CDs, and DVDs, that high-priced online stores change prices less frequently than low-priced online 
stores do.   
 
Internet retailers, thus, should be wary of the signals associated with their pricing approaches, 
especially if they are competing on quality.  The theory of quality signaling offers a possible 
                                                     
7 Blinder et al. (1998) assert that this theory appears only to be relevant for the luxury product market, or perhaps 
certain niche markets for clothes or food. The signaling of quality, however, applies to every type of good. Indeed, the 
providers of luxury goods can afford promotion expenses to inform the consumers about quality and the consumers 
have strong incentives to invest in gathering information about quality. For standard goods, pricing is an efficient 
means for both sides of the market to provide and get information about quality at a low cost.   
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explanation of price rigidity in Internet retailing, just as it does for traditional retailing. 
4.3. Psychological Price Points 
One of the recent additions to the lexicon of theories to explain price rigidity is Kashyap’s (1995) 
psychological price point theory, which builds on work in economics and marketing. This theoretical 
perspective appears to be useful in order to interpret the extent of price rigidity that has been 
observed to date (Blinder et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2010a). Kashyap argues that pricing managers 
attach great psychological importance to price point thresholds, such as $9 or 9¢, which consumers 
may misperceive or not round up, for different cognitive reasons.8
 
  He shows that catalog prices tend 
to have rigid price-endings. 
Price rigidity may occur due to rational inattention on the part of consumers. Rational inattention 
theory posits that it may be rational for consumers to be inattentive to the rightmost digit or digits in a 
price because they are constrained by time, resources, and information processing capacity (Lee et 
al., 2009; Sims, 2003). Since many consumers appear to ignore the last digit of the price, firms have 
an incentive to make it as high as possible at $9 or 9¢ (Basu, 1997).  Given the firm’s reaction to its 
customers’ inattention to the last digit of the price, rational consumers expect that firms will set it 
equal to 9¢. Thus, 9-endings may be a rational expectations equilibrium outcome (Basu, 1997). So, 
firms will tend to stick to prices with 9-endings even if they face cost shocks to change prices in small 
amounts, such as a 1¢ increase or decrease in cost.9
 
 The results of Levy et al. (2010a), who use 
about 100 million observations from grocery scanner data and the Internet, suggest that price points 
lead to price rigidity due to consumer inattention to the last digits of prices. An alternative perspective, 
put forward by Knotek (2010), is that some price points are set to speed transaction-making, 
especially when consumers buy items separately and have to wait in line to make a purchase. 
Psychological Price Points in Internet Retailing. What about price points in Internet retailing? 
Consumers on the Internet can easily compare prices and trace product information, as we have 
noted.  So, processing price information is much less costly on the Internet. With the use of the 
Internet as a new channel, and the existence of shopbots that allow consumers to see different prices 
side-by-side by price rank, consumers’ search costs are tremendously reduced (Bakos, 1997; Lee et 
al., 2009; Varian, 2000). Shopbots and search engines provide a basis for consumers to be able to 
give greater attention to price. Consumers who shop on the Internet should have better opportunities 
to use all the digits of a price in making purchase decisions. Thus, Internet retailers may use 
psychological price points such as 9-ending prices less frequently, leading prices to be less rigid 
compared to traditional retailers. So psychological price point theory may not be as relevant in 
explaining price rigidities in Internet retailing as it does in traditional marketing. 
 
There are few empirical studies that provide evidence for this in the Internet retailing context. Oh and 
Lucas (2006) report asymmetric and small price changes in online computer markets. They further 
note that small price increases occur more often than decreases due to the consumer’s rational 
inattention to small price changes. Levy et al. (2010a) also find that the use of 9-ending prices seems 
to vary across Internet-based selling channels in a way that is consistent with differences in the 
rational attentiveness that these channels engender with the consumers who use them. Bricks-and-
                                                     
8 For example, consumers may perceive an actual price of $999.99 as $999 or $990, or possibly even $900 
instead of $1,000. Blinder et al. (1998) also provide evidence on the importance of price points.  They find that 88 
percent of firms in the retail industry and 47 percent of firms in non-retail industries report some importance of 
psychological price points in their pricing decisions. 
9 This is because when the price-setter is facing a price change decision that would require, say, a price increase 
from $1.79 to $1.80, the increase may not be optimal if the customers ignore the last digit and perceive the 
change to be bigger than it actually is, for example, as a 10¢ increase. Such a misperception may decrease 
demand more than what is justified by the actual price increase of 1¢. Similarly, a price decrease from $1.79 to 
$1.78 may not have the desired effect on demand if consumers ignore the last digit. On the other hand, prices 
that do not end with a 9 may become more flexible compared to when consumers are rationally attentive. For 
example, an increase from $1.78 to $1.79 may not decrease demand at all if customers ignore the last digit. 
Similarly, a decrease from $1.80 to $1.79 may be perceived to be bigger (like a 10¢ decrease) than it actually is, 
and thus, may boost demand more than expected.  
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clicks firms use more 9-endings and change prices less frequently than Internet-only firms. 
4.4. Discussion of the Firm-to-Consumer Level of Analysis 
The firm-to-consumer level of analysis offers a second useful means to implement our multi-level 
theory analysis to yield unique insights. We reviewed the previous literature and five selected theories 
on price rigidity at this level of analysis, and evaluated the relationships that appear to be present 
between firm pricing and consumer behavior for Internet retailing. As we summarize in Table 4, some 
theories from traditional retailing seem readily applicable to Internet retailing. For example, implicit 
contracts and quality signaling explain some possible causes of price rigidity in Internet retailing with 
compelling empirical evidence. However, the explanations that we discussed related to search costs 
and psychological price points may not be as applicable to understanding what is happening with 
pricing in Internet retailing contexts.  
 
Table 4. Summary of Firm-to-Consumer Level of Analysis 
Theory 
Traditional Setting Internet Retailing 
Match 
with 
Theory Prediction 
Empirical 
Evidence Prediction 
Empirical 
Evidence 
Explicit  
Contracts 
Prices are fixed for 
the contract. 
Carlton (1979), 
Hubbard and 
Weiner (1992) 
Explicit contracts are 
seldom made. N/A N/A 
Implicit  
Contracts 
Prices are rigid due 
to customer 
antagonization. 
Mitev (2004), 
Powers and 
Powers (2001)  
Customer 
antagonization prevails 
due to lower search 
costs. 
Bergen et al. 
(2003), 
Rosencrane 
(2000) 
Yes 
Search Costs 
Customer search 
costs lead to kinked 
demand curve. 
N/A 
Lower search costs 
online make prices 
flexible. 
Ghose and Gu 
(2008) No 
Quality  
Signaling 
Firms do not change 
prices not to signal 
quality reduction. 
Allen (1988) 
High quality, high-price 
firms do not change 
prices frequently. 
Baylis and Perloff 
(2002), Kauffman 
and Lee (2004b) 
Yes 
Psychological 
Price Points 
Prices are stuck at 
certain price 
endings. 
Kashyap 
(1995), Levy et 
al. (2010a) 
Prices are not stuck at 
certain price endings 
due to how consumers 
rationally focus their 
attention. 
Levy et al. 
(2010a) No 
5. The Firm-to-Market Level of Analysis  
In the economics of industrial organization, it is commonly noted that the sluggishness of prices in 
response to demand shifts is basically a demonstration of market power (Okun, 1981).  For example, 
a duopoly with fixed costs of price adjustment is more flexible in price changes than a monopoly 
under certain conditions (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1987). In many industries, pricing strategies are 
interdependent because each firm takes into account the actions of its competitors. Without an 
effective coordinating mechanism like an intermediary for market clearing, each firm hesitates to 
change prices until other firms move first, and thus, prices may remain fixed (Blinder et al., 1998).   
 
What about Internet retailing markets though? Will the same dynamics obtain? The Internet enhances 
the performance of markets by reducing the transaction costs necessary to produce and market 
goods and services in various ways. They include increasing managerial efficiencies, enabling firms 
to connect their supply chains with suppliers and buyers. This offers them new ways to collect 
detailed data about consumers’ purchasing behavior, making prices and costs more transparent, 
lowering technological barriers to entry, and creating more competitive markets (Baker et al., 2001; 
Litan and Rivlin, 2001; Sinha, 2000). So, market forces in Internet retailing may also play quite 
different roles in firms’ strategic pricing and price adjustment decisions compared to in traditional 
environments. Our multi-level theory analysis now turns to the macro-level of analysis of market 
structures – the firm-to-market level – including the degree of competition and coordination failures. 
(See Figure 4.) 
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Monopoly power (industry concentration) and  
coordination failure (price leadership, tacit collusion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Firm-to-Market Level Analysis for Price Rigidity in Internet Retailing 
5.1. Industry Concentration 
Economists have emphasized monopoly power or a limited number of sellers in markets as the 
primary cause of price rigidity or inflexibility (Dixon, 1983; Qualls, 1979). Numerous studies have inve
stigated the theory of industry concentration. They have generated three different observations on the  
relationship between the degree of industry concentration and price rigidity: a positive relationship, a 
negative relationship, and no significant relationship. Due to the difficulty in measuring the competitive 
conditions in a given market, most of the studies have focused on a proxy measure for market compe
titiveness, especially industry and market concentration. This has been measured by the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman index, which gauges what share of a market is held by the first x-number of the largest  
firms (Tirole, 1988). It provides a rudimentary indicator of the extent of monopoly power. 
 
The reason there might be a positive
 
 relationship is that highly-concentrated industries behave as  
oligopolies and have the attendant problems of pricing coordination. An oligopolistic firm expects its  
competitors to react differently to a price increase and decrease. Although a price decrease is likely 
to be followed, a price increase probably won’t be (Sweezy, 1939).  Another explanation for this relati
onship is limit pricing or pricing to prevent entry, where firms in concentrated industries are able to  
enjoy increasing returns to scale, and thus, they tend to keep their prices lower than they otherwise  
would in order to discourage or delay new firm entry (Carlton, 1986; Stiglitz, 1984). Rotemberg and  
Saloner (1987), in a comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets, develop a theoretical explanation 
of market power for price rigidity, showing that firms in less competitive markets change prices less of
ten. Ginsburgh and Michel (1988) find a negative link between the degree of industry concentration a
nd the speed of quantity adjustment in an oligopolistic industry with quadratic cost functions.   
Several empirical works corroborate this argument in traditional retail settings. Carlton (1986) reports 
a positive relationship between rigid prices and the degree of industry concentration: The more highly 
concentrated an industry, the less rapidly will cost variations be transmitted into prices. Hannan and  
Berger (1991) find evidence from the banking industry of a significant positive relationship between in
dustry concentration and price rigidity, and a limited level of asymmetric behavior. Neumark and  
Sharpe (1992), using panel data on bank deposit behavior, find an asymmetric relationship between  
industry concentration and price rigidity: downward price rigidity and upward price flexibility in concent
rated markets.   
 
The justification for a negative relationship between industry concentration and price rigidity, as claim
ed by Stigler (1964), is that it is easier for other competitors to identify secret price-cutting when there 
are fewer firms in an industry (Domberger, 1979). Thus, firms avoid the secret cutting of prices.  
Domberger (1979), in his study on 21 industries using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of  
concentration, shows a negative relationship between price rigidity and industry concentration. Power
s and Powers (2001), analyzing grocery store price data, find that higher degrees of industry concentr
ation lead to frequent and large price changes. 
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The third perspective of no significant relationship between industry concentration and price rigidity is 
based on the argument that industrial concentration is not a key determinant of industrial pricing  
behavior (Dixon, 1983). Without a perfect monopoly or explicit pricing collusion, firms tend to behave 
as price competitors, and the degree of industrial concentration is inconsequential (Qualls, 1979).  
Starting with a slightly adapted version of the model from Ginsburg and Michel (1988), Worthington  
(1989) demonstrates the possibility of an uncertain relationship between industry concentration and  
pricing behavior. Higher industry concentration may result in an increase, a decrease, or no change in 
price rigidity. Dixon (1983), using Australian economic data, reports no significant relationship 
between industry concentration and price rigidity. Jackson (1997), using rational distributed lag and  
price adjustment models, provides empirical evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between  
industry concentration and price rigidity. 
 
Industry Concentration in Internet Retailing. What are the impacts of the technologies on Internet 
retailing markets? Do they create more competitive markets compared to traditional channels? 
Various observers say that the Internet environment offers less concentrated markets but, 
nevertheless, creates more competition by lowering technological barriers to entry due to lower set-up 
costs, as well as the lower marginal costs of production and distribution (Daripa and Kapur, 2001; Lat
covich and smith, 2001).  To survive in such competitive environments, Internet retailers require a 
significant level of investment in advertising and IT infrastructure. The necessary economies of scale 
for these kinds of investments raise barriers to entry and may induce greater industry concentration in 
markets (Daripa and Kapur, 2001; Shaked and Sutton, 1987).  Amazon.com’s takeover of the online 
operations of Toys“R”Us and Borders offers a case in point. Latcovich and Smith (2001) also report th
at the online book market has become more concentrated than the traditional book retailing industry 
in the United States. They calculated the top four firm aggregate market share for online booksellers 
at 93 percent, while the same metric for the traditional book retailing industry was only 45 percent. 
Other research reported that the four largest Internet retailers accounted for 99.8 percent of the total 
number of Internet hits for book retailers in 2000 (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000).  Highly-concentrated 
online markets may allow firms to exploit market power by reducing the costs of driving traffic to their 
websites. In such markets, consumers bear fewer costs to get information about the prices posted by 
each of the competitors. In addition, consumers can easily detect price changes through the use of 
search engines or shopbots if there are fewer sellers in a market. So, firms may be reluctant to 
change prices. Thus, the theory of industry concentration provides a possible explanation for price 
rigidities in Internet retailing. 
 
There are few empirical studies that provide evidence for this related to Internet retailing.  Kauffman 
and Lee (2007) examine homogenous online products, including books, CDs, and DVDs. They find 
that high concentration leads to high price rigidity. From this work, they also find that books, where 
the industry is the most concentrated, change prices the least frequently (more than two times less 
than CDs and 3.5 times less than DVDs). Although the true relationship between industry  
concentration and price rigidity is not clearly defined in prior research, highly-concentrated industries 
on the Internet, like books and CDs may behave as oligopolies with the corresponding price  
coordination problems, resulting in greater price rigidity. 
5.2. Coordination Failure 
Coordination failure theory states that the inability of firms to plan and implement pricing in 
coordination with one another is due to externalities or a lack of coordination mechanisms that may 
affect them in different ways. Coordination failures can be explained by many sources of 
heterogeneity among firms: differences in size, cost structure, product differentiation, and information 
(Tirole, 1988). Blinder et al. (1998) suggest two theories to explain such coordination problems: price 
leadership and implicit collusion. They find coordination failure theory to be the most revealing in their 
list of theories. 
 
Several studies on coordination failure have characterized firms’ pricing behavior in markets of  
imperfect competition as price leadership (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990; Tyagi, 1999).  Price 
leadership occurs when one of the firms in an industry sets the price or announces a price change, 
and the other firms then take the price as given. The price leadership model is solved just like the 
leader-follower Stackelberg model. One firm, the Stackelberg leader, can commit to its output first, 
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and then, the second mover, the Stackelberg follower, produces its quantity knowing the output of the 
leader.10
 
  
Another explanation for the coordination failure is based on firms’ tacit collusion. Chamberlin (1929)  
argues that oligopolistic firms can maintain the monopoly price by cooperating with their competitors  
even without a formal agreement to avoid intense price competition.  Such collusion can be very  
difficult to sustain in the following situations: when large business fluctuations occur in the presence  
of minimal punishment for collusion, when large gains from cheating are possible, and when detection 
lags make it difficult to apprehend the transgressor (Tirole, 1988). Stiglitz (1984) argues that firms’ 
collusive agreements are non-cooperative equilibria that lead to price rigidities. Rotemberg and Salon
er (1986), offering a supergame-theoretic model of oligopolistic behavior during booms, point out that 
collusion is more difficult to sustain because the gain from defection increases in current demand.  
The loss from punishment increases in future demand.  Cooper and John (1988) propose that 
strategic complementarity in prices will lead to multiple equilibria that are superior to low-activity 
equilibria. So an agent’s optimal level of price flexibility will depend positively on other agents’ 
strategies. Ball and Romer (1991), by combining this notion of strategic complementarity with menu 
costs in deciding prices under imperfect competition, show that price flexibility in one firm encourages 
other firms to make their prices flexible. Andersen (1994) argues that strategic complementarity 
between prices charged by different firms can increase price rigidity. According to collusion theory, 
thus, prices could be rigid because of incentives for firms to sustain higher prices through implicit 
agreements. 
 
Coordination Failures in Internet Retailing.  Is Internet retailing affected by some of these issues? 
No doubt, it is. Internet retailing technologies make it easier for sellers and buyers to compare 
products and prices by using search engines (Bakos, 1997; Varian, 2000). The diffusion of related 
technologies increases the cost transparency and pricing strategies of market participants (Daripa 
and Kapur, 2001). In traditional channels, firms do not respond instantly to competitors’ price 
reductions. Instead, it takes time for them to learn about price changes, and there may be menu costs 
for making the changes. But the Internet has created a technological environment in which sellers are 
able to monitor and react to competitor price movements much more rapidly than ever before. This 
creates the impetus for firms to engage in tacit collusion. The U.S. Department of Justice argued for 
this conclusion about the online travel agent, Orbitz, in 1999, for example. By being more transparent, 
Internet retailing markets may become more competitive. This permits firms to beat competitor prices 
with competitive price change moves or to match competitor prices with tacitly collusive price change 
moves. Knowing that competitors rapidly learn about price cuts, however, Internet retailers have 
become more cautious about changing prices, and increasingly have adopted price structures that 
create signals for their competitors, a form of tacit collusion (Daripa and Kapur, 2001). Thus, online 
prices can be rigid due to incentives to sustain higher prices.  
 
Internet retailing-relevant technologies appear to enable firms to tacitly collude to keep their prices  
higher. A number of researchers have studied this theory and provided interesting results to support  
this view. Bailey (1998) provides empirical evidence for convergence of book prices that prices  
between Amazon.com and BN.com were almost the same four months after BN entered into the  
Internet bookselling industry. Varian (2000) also demonstrates how collusion is occurring in the  
Internet bookselling industry by tracking a book price. There is some evidence from the bookselling  
and CD industries to suggest that Internet retailers tacitly collude via swift reactions to competitors’  
prices. Finally, Campbell et al. (2005) show that reduced consumer search costs to locate lower 
prices and firms’ enhanced capability to detect cheating on collusive price arrangements facilitate the 
firms’ incentives to sustain collusion and result in higher prices.  
                                                     
10 The kinked demand curve (Hall and Hitch, 1939; Sweezy, 1939), the classic explanation for price rigidity in 
oligopolistic industries, depicts the firm’s reluctance to cut prices. Competitors match price reductions and, 
consequently, the first firm to make a price change cannot gain market share by lowering its price. For cost increases 
affecting several rival firms, each individual firm may be unwilling to remain the price leader out of fear that its 
competitors will not follow and the firm will then lose its market share (Blinder et al., 1998; Okun, 1981).   
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5.3. Discussion of the Firm-to-Market Level of Analysis 
We reviewed the previous literature and theories on price rigidity at the firm-to-market level, and 
considered the firm’s reaction to market structure, especially the extent of competition and 
coordination failures, in changing prices in Internet retailing. Table 5 gives an overview of the theories 
and empirical results for traditional market observations of price rigidity, as possible explanations of 
price rigidity in Internet retailing. Industry concentration theory and coordination failure theory are 
good examples of why multi-level theory is appropriate for understanding how Internet retailing-
related technologies might affect market prices. This provides evidence for why the recent market 
observations and empirical findings dovetail with the predictions of theory that are able to uniquely 
characterize the firm-to-market level of analysis. 
 
Table 5. Summary of the Firm-to-Market Level of Analysis 
Theory 
Traditional Setting Internet Retailing Match 
with  
Theory Prediction 
Empirical  
Evidence Prediction 
Empirical  
Evidence 
Industry  
Concentration 
High industry 
concentration 
leads to more 
price rigidity. 
Carlton 
(1986), 
Hannan and 
Berger 
(1991) 
High industry 
concentration 
reduces price 
competition. 
Kauffman and 
Lee (2007) Yes 
Coordination  
Failures 
Coordination 
failures lead to 
price rigidity. 
N/A 
To avoid intense 
competition, firms 
collude on price 
changes. 
Bailey (1998), 
Varian (2000) Yes 
6. Discussion  
Price rigidity is a topic of long-standing interest for marketing science researchers and economists, for 
senior managers in firms in different industries, and for those who seek to better understand the 
economy as a whole. We next provide a critical assessment of the value and benefits of the 
evaluation of different theories that we have undertaken, and whether it holds in the Internet retailing 
context. We consider how we might be able to use these theories in combination with one another to 
further advance our understanding of price rigidity in Internet retailing. We will also consider the 
diversity of findings across the different research streams we have explored, as a basis for offering a 
new and insightful synthesis of the theoretical perspectives that will drive our future research agenda. 
In this context, we ask: What are the next-stage issues that we should be focusing on and why? How 
has a multi-level theoretical perspective informed our exploration of them? What sorts of research will 
this prompt that we have not seen to date?  
6.1. Taking Stock of the Evidence on Price Rigidity in Internet Retailing 
At the beginning of this article, we asked a key question that we addressed using a multi-level 
theoretical research perspective: Should we expect less price rigidity in Internet retailing? Our 
cautious and counter-intuitive answer on the basis of this broad body of theoretical knowledge and 
the related empirical findings is: probably not
 
. We examined evidence that is specific to the firm-level 
of analysis, as well as other findings that bridge the firm-to-consumer and firm-to-market levels of 
analysis. We have been able to piece together a richer understanding of how Internet retailing 
technology represents a process variable that mediates the observed outcomes of price rigidity and 
price adjustment.  
We first summarize the main findings of the related literature, including empirical studies that focus on 
price rigidity and price adjustment in Internet retailing. These studies use different kinds of product 
categories (books, CDs, DVDs, computer products), the pricing practices of Internet retailers, time 
interval differences (daily, weekly, bi-weekly), and different time periods between 1997 and 2006 to 
measure the duration of price adjustments in the Internet retailing context. The literature suggests 
that the time between price adjustments is a pragmatic indirect proxy for price rigidity (Cecchetti, 
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1986; Levy et al. 2002). Table 6 summarizes the results of these studies. 
 
The duration of price adjustments ranged from 23 days for computer products (Ray et al., 2008) to 
161 days for books (Chakrabarti and Scholnick, 2005) in the studies we tracked. The average 
duration for price changes across the different studies appears to be approximately 70 days for 
Internet retailing. With the reduced physical costs of adjustment on the Internet, we expected to find 
less price rigidity for Internet retailers in comparison to traditional bricks-and-mortar stores. But this is 
not what we observe. For example, the findings of Dutta et al. (1999) related to price changes in 
supermarket chains suggest that prices change about twice as frequently as observed in the previous 
literature. In addition, Levy et al. (1998) report on the analysis of similar kinds of data from drug store 
chains. Our estimates for Internet retailers are more consistent with the findings for drug store chains, 
which changed prices about every 93 or 94 days in the 1990s. Thus, in spite of the new technologies 
that are available for the Internet, there may be other theoretical explanations that will help to explain 
how firms approach adjusting prices in Internet retailing. 
 
Table 6.  Empirical Research on Price Rigidity in Internet Retailing 
Research Period 
Data 
Interval 
Product 
Category 
Number of 
Products 
Number of 
E-tailers 
Data 
Points 
Duration of 
Price Change 
Bailey (1998) 02/1997–03/1997 Weekly 
Books, CDs 
and Software    337   48     23,789 44 days 
Bergen et al. 
(2005) 
03/2003–
06/2004 Daily Books    377     2   337,792 90 days 
Brynjolfsson and 
Smith (2000) 
02/1998–
05/1999 Weekly 
Books and 
CDs      80   16       4,485 61 days 
Chakrabarti and 
Scholnick (2005) 
03/2000–
04/2001 Weekly Books 3,124     2    343,640 161 days 
Clay et al. 
(2002b) 
08/1999–
01/2000 Daily Books     399   26    552,110 66 days 
Ghose and Gu 
(2008) 
09/2005–
04/2006 Daily Books 3,210    2 1,138,918 74 days 
Kauffman and Lee 
(2004b) 
03/2003–
02/2004 Daily Books   387   11 1,158,388 75 days 
Kauffman and 
Wood (2007) 
02/2000–
03/2000 Daily 
Books and 
CDs   169   53      92,496 55 days 
Levy et al. 
(2010a) 
03/2003–
04/2005 Daily 
CDs, DVDs 
and computer 
products 
  474 293 2,650,994 64 days 
Oh and Lucas 
(2006) 
03/1999–
02/2000 Bi-weekly 
Computer 
products     37   14      11,541 36 days 
Ray et al. (2008) 01/2005–10/2005 Daily 
Computer 
products 1,052 102    669,557 23 days 
Tang and Xing 
(2001) 
07/2000–
08/2000 
Weekly  
(5 days) DVDs       51   12        4,284 95 days 
 
A multi-level theory approach is especially useful in this analysis context, since it gives us greater 
capability to identify the theories whose knowledge is most actionable for the different levels of 
analysis. The firm-specific level of analysis is relatively traditional in economic terms, and is often 
used and relatively well understood in general terms. Its power lies in the understanding we are able 
to develop about the connections between the firm and its technology deployment decisions, and how 
they change impacts for consumers and markets.  
 
Firm-specific level theories provide the first perspective to understand these results.  We can see that 
most price-change observations from the different studies are less than we might expect, assuming 
that Internet retailing-related technology somehow has the potential to change everything. At the firm-
specific level of analysis, as we know from the extensive evaluation of the literature in Section 3, the 
theory of managerial costs, price synchronization and staggering theory, non-price competition theory, 
and explanations about firm pricing choices during periods of high demand potentially have the 
greatest power to explain why we see different durations of time between the firms’ and industries’ 
price changes. The obvious conclusion that one can draw at this level of analysis is that Internet 
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retailing-related technologies are probably only able to partially explain price-change behavior, since 
other firm-level issues are likely to be important too. Even though menu costs have very likely 
declined, factors that are more closely associated with the other theories at the firm-specific level may 
offer greater explanatory power. 
 
At the firm-to-consumer level of analysis, as we learned in our analysis work in Section 4, the key 
explanations for price rigidity in Internet retailing are the existence of implicit contracts between firms 
and their customers, and efforts to signal product quality through prices. Such explanations are 
helpful to interpret why we observe different durations of time between price changes. Even in the 
absence of the effects of explicit contracts and consumer search costs, there still is a need to explain 
the outcomes based on heterogeneities a level up from the firm-to-consumer level though.  
 
The third level of analysis of our multi-level theory framework – the firm-to-market level – may offer 
additional power for interpretation. In Section 5, we reported that both of the firm-to-market level 
theories – monopoly power and industry concentration theory, and coordination failure theory – 
successfully explained price rigidity in empirical research. The theories may have specific relevance 
in explaining durations between price changes. To do this will require performing comparative meta-
analysis of the empirical results across the studies that we noted in Table 6 to ascertain the role of the 
industries. We include books, music CDs, movie DVDs, and computer products. This is not too great 
a span of Internet retailing areas so as to preclude meaningful comparative analysis. Moreover, by 
controlling for industry, time period, number of retailers, number of products, the data collection 
interval, and so on, we are likely to be able to obtain a lot more information about why we see such 
different durations of time between price changes. Again, we expect that the multi-level, multi-
theoretical perspective that we propose will be especially revealing for authors who conduct follow-on 
research in the price rigidity area for Internet retailing 
6.2. Toward a Multi-Level Variance Theory of Price Rigidity in Internet  
   Retailing 
Price rigidity in Internet retailing should be reconsidered in the appropriate multi-level theoretical and 
practical terms: using psychological price points, customer antagonism, and non-price elements, as 
well as other competitive considerations. These include managerial capabilities, the sophistication of 
the competition, and a firm’s chosen price-quality-service profile in the market, among other 
considerations. These may all provide a basis for a multi-level variance theory of Internet-based price 
rigidity and price adjustment, consistent with some of the foundational work conducted by Van de Ven 
(2007) on variance theory-building, and the applied work of Sabherwal and Robey (1995) on variance 
and process theory development.  
 
We view the opportunity for theorizing in this area as going somewhat beyond typical variance theory 
approaches. In this article, we have argued for the relevance of distinguishing how different theories 
can help to support our understanding of causality at distinctly different levels of analysis. We 
proposed three analytic levels at which different theories seem to provide different degrees of 
usefulness. They include the firm-specific level, the firm-to-consumer level, and the firm-to-market 
level.   
 
These ideas represent a range of theory-based explanations that support an argument against
The primary tension in the current literature involves how to provide theory-driven explanations to 
support the belief that prices in Internet retailing ought to be more flexible and more often adjusted. 
The counter-perspective is that there are underlying drivers of price rigidity that will persist. We now 
 the 
likelihood of observing greater price flexibility in the digital economy when technology play a pivotal 
role in the setting of a firm’s prices. Table 7 summarizes the possible causes and expected results 
that different interdisciplinary theories suggest for price rigidity in Internet retailing, to provide 
synthesis of our ideas for the reader. The mediating role of Internet retailing-related technologies is an 
important basis for distinguishing the likely effects on price rigidity on the Internet relative to the non-
Internet channel. It will be necessary to supplement this theoretical perspective with other aspects of 
theoretical knowledge at the different levels of analysis for which we have argued in this article.  
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consider the balance of the impact of these factors from the multi-level theory perspective that we 
have suggested.   
 
At the firm-specific level, price adjustments are supported by the new technological capabilities of the 
Internet retailer beyond the traditional limits of menu costs. Changes in the underlying technologies 
that support the production of price changes at the level of the firm lead to changes in the costs of 
adjustment. The technology may not impact other factors that are central to pricing decisions by firms, 
although the Internet will change some of the observed patterns of price adjustment. At the firm-to-
consumer level, Internet retailing-related technologies make it possible for the firm to operate in a 
dramatically different manner. It is able to obtain consumer-related information much more cheaply 
and rapidly than ever before. This creates the basis for more responsive and effective price-setting.  
At the firm-to-market level, current technologies also make it possible for the firm to engage in other 
forms of market-sensing activities that emphasize forces that go beyond consumer reactions. For 
example, new technologies that support procurement in electronic markets and vendor-managed 
inventory will assist retailers to smooth their costs and implement pricing strategies that are more 
effective over time. 
 
Table 7. Causes of and Expected Outcomes for Price Rigidity in Internet Retailing: 
               A Multi-Level Theory Interpretation 
Theories Possible Causes and Expected Outcomes 
The Firm-Specific Level 
Price  
Adjustment  
Costs 
Menu costs are rapidly diminishing within firms due to the Internet. Simple database 
updates are possible and easily programmed, so price changes are cheap to 
implement in Internet retailing.  
Prices may still remain unchanged for other reasons in Internet retailing. There still 
are managerial costs due to integration efforts, for example. 
Inventories 
and Demand 
There is a greater probability that changes in prices in Internet retailing are affected 
by demand as opposed to inventories due to real-time inventory systems and no 
physical inventories at pure-Internet firms. 
Non-Price 
Competition 
Strategic uses of non-price elements are effective in competition in Internet retailing. 
Seller reputation, service quality, and other distinguishing characteristics can be 
leveraged for gains too. 
The Firm-to-Consumer Level 
Contracts 
Explicit contracting may produce rigid prices on the Internet, however, explicit 
contracts are seldom executed in Internet retailing. 
Implicit contracts may explain rigid prices in Internet retailing, where customer 
antagonization and undesirable switching costs create inertia for price adjustment. 
Lower search costs may not overcome the implicit contract costs, though. 
Asymmetric 
Information 
Too much price adjustment may signal lower quality products in Internet retailing. 
High-price, high-quality firms should have less flexible prices as a result. 
Search costs on the Internet are almost negligible, so the demand curve will not kink. 
Lower search costs make it possible for consumers to take advantage of sudden 
price adjustments too. 
Psychologic
al Price 
Points 
Psychological price points may diminish the effects of rapid price adjustments in 
Internet retailing. Reduced information processing costs occur due to new ITs, so 
online consumers may be more rationally attentive to prices. 
The Firm-to-Market Level 
Market  
Structure 
High industry concentration leads to more price rigidity for sales via the Internet, as 
we have seen in online bookselling. Economies of scale and limit pricing support this 
outcome also. 
Coordination failures are also likely in Internet retailing. Stackelberg follow-the-leader 
pricing is possible, but may lead to problems with profitability. So firms may use tacit 
collusion to avoid intense price competition. 
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6.3. Other Research Directions to Leverage the Multi-Level Theory  
  Perspective 
We have identified four research directions related to price rigidity and flexibility in Internet retailing 
that seem likely to yield new theoretical and managerial knowledge, if the appropriate exploratory 
efforts are made.  Each is based on a key observation about multi-level theory development. This 
process offers the analyst a chance to understand multiple facets of the same phenomenon, albeit 
with a different relational lens (the firm, the firm and its consumers, and the firm and its markets), and 
a relevant theoretical perspective.   
 
Price Synchronization and Staggering in Hybrid Bricks-and-Clicks Firms. To be able to deal with 
the issues and develop explanations about price rigidity and flexibility, it will be necessary to theorize 
across different kinds of operations, including physical stores versus the websites of hybrid bricks-and 
clicks firms. Examples include Target and Best Buy, which are so well funded that it is possible for 
them to synchronize price changes well when it suits their strategies. On the other hand, we might 
expect staggered price changes, also based on technology capabilities that support strategic pricing 
for the organization. Best Buy appears to be so familiar with channel and location-based pricing that it 
is in a position practice strategic synchronization or staggering of price changes when its analysts 
determine that one or the other approach is value-maximizing.  
 
Internet-Based Psychological Price Points. Establishing new psychological price points on the 
Internet can change consumer preferences in the presence of search engines. We are thinking about 
firms moving beyond 9-ending prices, since there is not much opportunity for a firm to distinguish 
itself with consumers if all the prices delivered by shopbots end in 99¢. So now we see prices ending 
in 76¢, 88¢, 43¢, and so on at Wal-Mart’s online sites, among others, as well as to-the-dollar pricing 
(Lee et al., 2009). This seems to be a firm-specific technology capability-driven choice, since Wal-
Mart is undoubtedly exploiting the advantages that search engines can give when the company 
implements non-9-ending prices. It is also an approach that may be related to consumer psychology, 
since pricing away from the usual psychological price points has arisen.  So this also seems like an 
appropriate direction for exploring the impacts of Internet retailing-related technologies.  
 
Product Life Cycle.  A firm’s pricing strategy will also change as its product, markets, and 
competitors change over time. Product life is the duration of the availability of a product or service in 
the marketplace. We encourage further study of price changes at the firm-specific level, as well as the 
firm-to-market level. When the life of a product or a service is perishable (airline tickets and hotel 
rooms) or limited (computer products and electronics), firms sell their products and services through 
distinct stages of their individual life cycles (Kotler, 2008). Each is likely to pose different strategic 
pricing challenges, opportunities, and problems for sellers, including pricing with launch discounts for 
new products, setting higher prices to capture full market value from consumers for maturing 
products, and adjusting prices downward when the product passes its prime. Recall Table 6, which 
showed that computer products exhibit a shorter duration for price changes – 36 days according to 
Oh and Lucas (2006) and 23 days according to Ray et al. (2008), compared to other non-perishable 
products, such as books, CDs and DVDs. This indicates that firms have incentives to change the 
prices of products with a more limited life frequently, such as for computer books and software 
products that are subject to versioning. We also know anecdotally and from data that we have worked 
with over the years that firm-level price change behavior is heterogeneous across different industries 
and markets related to product life cycle considerations. We advocate the exploration of how Internet 
retailing-related technologies affect price-change behavior among firms in different industries that sell 
diverse products, and especially those that differ in the amount of time that a product can be sold at a 
relatively full price. We expect that there will be interesting differences in how the Internet is used for 
pricing when a product is subject to frequent technological changes and rapid obsolescence. 
 
Price Information Diffusion.  The speed of price information diffusion for Internet retailing 
increasingly mimics the diffusion of financial market-based prices for financial instruments. As a 
result, we see another direction for research that involves all three of our multi-level theory-building 
and analysis levels: the firm-specific level for technology investments; the firm-to-market level for 
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theory about the multiple paths that price diffusion now takes; and the firm-to-consumer level as a 
means to characterize information-induced behavioral changes on the part of consumers. We call for 
research that characterizes Internet retailing more in terms of financial market-based information 
flows and the changed dynamics of consumer responses, so that we can begin to understand firm-
specific choices about how to optimize the business process for setting prices and the new price-
change behaviors of firms.  
7. Conclusion 
In this research, we presented a critical survey of the relevant theory to support our analysis of price 
rigidity in Internet retailing. In the process of developing this research, we have applied new thinking 
about the use of multi-level theory development ideas. We have sought to make the process plain 
and compelling to the reader and logically consistent with the range of existing findings. Moreover, in 
spite of the large body of knowledge that exists in the economics and marketing literature, the 
essence of our work here has been to produce IS research-relevant knowledge. We have been 
selectively inclusive of just
7.1. Managerial Contributions 
 those theories that represent focal theories for IS researchers related to 
the study of various price rigidity-related issues in Internet retailing. We next discuss the primary 
managerial contributions and limitations of this work. 
Who should care about trends in price rigidity in Internet retailing, and who will benefit from the new 
knowledge that we have developed? Who will be able to use the information that we present about 
price rigidity, and how will they use it? How does this research work help senior managers, IS and 
marketing professionals, and industry consultants and other observers to make better sense of the 
world of Internet retailing?   
 
We have argued for the importance of Internet retailing-related technologies as a mediating influence 
in price rigidity and price flexibility across different sales channels within the same firm and across 
firms in the same channel. From a practitioner’s point of view, this research enables senior managers, 
marketing analysts, and industry consultants to achieve a better understanding of price change 
dynamics in the context of Internet retailing. Such knowledge should empower their strategy 
formulation and decision-making. Our research also helps pricing managers more thoroughly 
understand the dynamics of pricing in online environments.  
 
The analysis framework that we have presented spans the spectrum of pricing strategy contexts from 
the micro level of the consumer and the firm to the macro level of the market. Senior managers and 
marketing analysts will benefit from knowing that Internet retailers compete on the basis of the price 
levels they set and the capabilities that they possess to change prices. This research will provide 
them with a comprehensive overview of the literature, and the kinds of analyses that help uncover the 
hidden patterns of price rigidity and flexibility within their competitive environment. The knowledge 
that we offer applies to different kinds of products and retailers and to the different price levels of the 
goods and services they sell too. Knowing about the duration patterns of price changes in a 
competitive environment permits the formulation of proactive rather than reactive pricing strategy. 
Further, when marketing and IS professionals come to know more about the underlying structures of 
pricing strategy in their companies’ markets, they will be able to be more innovative and effective in 
the creation of IT artifacts that can transform the power of their approaches to strategic pricing. These 
include business intelligence and data mining tools, for example. Clearly, IT and technological 
innovation represent an important engine for that transformation.  
7.2. Limitations and Final Thoughts 
Several words of caution are in order on the perspectives that we have offered in this article. First, 
technology is not the only force at work driving price change capabilities and what we have observed 
about Internet retailing. For example, we have not considered cultural and geographical factors, 
international linkages that may affect firms’ business policies on a local level, or other external forces 
involving some industry-specific business practices and policies for price stability. Second, nor have 
we considered situations in which legal, regulatory and other non-business considerations are likely 
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to play a significant role. An example of this came with the recent and historic rise in gasoline prices 
in the U.S. in 2008 and 2009. Government lawyers and concerned citizens made public accusations 
about price gouging, antitrust actions, and exploitative profiteering in the wake of rising prices that 
had nothing to do with the Internet.    
 
Third, we have not attempted to characterize what may happen over a longer period of time, as 
Internet retailing-related technologies, and the business processes that are affected by them, evolve. 
The process of arriving at an economic equilibrium with respect to pricing behavior in Internet retailing 
will involve firm-level considerations of how to optimize technology investments to drive pricing 
strategy, based on perceptions of the corresponding profitability and return on investment. It will also 
involve exogenous changes in the technologies themselves, which means management must come 
to an understanding of how to implement them to most effectively enhance pricing practices. Thus, 
we would expect there to be a time lag for other impacts and changes to arise, since it will take time 
for the market to figure out how best to employ emerging technologies. This might offer opportunities 
for IS researchers to develop process theories about how changing technology affects pricing 
strategy and price-changing behavior within organizations at a micro-level, and at a more macro level 
in different industries in the market (Sabherwal and Robey, 1995; Van de Ven, 2007). 
 
In addition, it will take time for Internet retailing-related systems integration efforts to truly take hold in 
business practice. This will impede senior executives’ efforts to understand the efficacy of technology 
use in support of pricing for Internet retailing. Finally, the technological evolution of organizational 
business processes for pricing is affected by changes and transformations in other business 
processes. We see this today, for example, with systems development outsourcing, IT services 
contracting, web services, and business process outsourcing, where pricing increasingly emulates 
price-setting approaches that are associated with financial markets. Another example involves 
suppliers that set future prices for corporate purchases of production resources and travel services, 
where risk management and hedging concerns arise. Future theorizing should extend our 
understanding of the role and impact of technology in these kinds of pricing settings. 
We have drawn on different theoretical perspectives from economics and marketing to explain the 
price-changing behavior of Internet retailers. These are the players in the digital economy who are 
among the most effective users of new technologies. Even though they are well known within other 
disciplines, the theories we have evaluated related to price rigidity and adjustment are fairly novel to 
the IS field. They offer rich opportunities to support new theory-building and empirical research on 
investments in Internet retailing-related technologies and their effects. Such interdisciplinary studies 
will provide a foundation for the development of new theories at the crossroads of the academic 
disciplines of marketing, economics, and IS.  
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